The
cancellation
of
the
Northern
leg
of
HS2
almost
a
year
ago
was
caused
by
a
combination
of
political
factors,
according
to
a
report
by
the
Institution
of
Civil
Engineers.
After
Phases
2A
and
2B
to
Crewe
and
Manchester
were
cancelled
by
former
Prime
Minister
Rishi
Sunak
last
October,
the
ICE
launched
a
‘Next
Steps
Programme’
in
April
in
a
bid
to
analyse
what
had
gone
wrong
with
the
project,
which
has
also
lost
its
Eastern
Leg
to
the
East
Midlands
and
Yorkshire.
Work
is
continuing
on
Phase
1
between
London
and
Birmingham,
but
even
part
of
this
Phase
remains
in
doubt,
because
it
is
not
clear
whether
high
speed
trains
will
ever
go
beyond
Old
Oak
Common
in
west
London
to
reach
Euston.
The
ICE
has
concluded
that
politicians
were
to
blame
for
the
spiralling
costs,
rather
than
engineers
or
the
construction
industry.
It
says:
‘It
is
not
possible
to
separate
politics
from
major
infrastructure
projects’.
The
Labour
government
stands
accused
of
‘rushing’
the
initial
planning,
so
that
HS2
Ltd
could
be
set
up
before
the
2010
general
election.
There
was
a
bid
to
get
political
support,
so
that
tunnels
were
lengthened
to
reduce
the
impact
of
the
new
railway
without
considering
the
costs
and
benefits.
Once
set
up,
there
was
too
much
turnover
in
leadership
at
HS2
Ltd,
with
the
result
that
significant
decisions
were
‘dumped’
by
the
new
managers,
who
did
not
appreciate
the
implications.
The
report
says:
‘The
personnel
changes
…
meant
that
intended
future
decisions,
not
made
but
tacitly
understood,
would
have
been
lost.
One
example
is
the
expectation
that
HS2
would
use
standardised
designs
for
bridges:
this
was
not
followed
through
in
procurement
decisions,
with
huge
cost
implications.’
It
adds:
‘What
has
been
achieved
so
far
on
Phase
1
demonstrates
the
civil
engineering
and
construction
capability
in
the
UK
to
deliver
a
project
of
this
scale.
HS2
has
driven
innovation
in
delivery
practices,
including
pioneering
ways
to
reduce
the
impacts
of
large-scale
infrastructure
projects.’
Recommendations
include
that
the
benefits
of
projects
must
be
clearly
defined
and
communicated
so
there’s
clarity
and
consistency
about
the
project’s
purpose
for
politicians
and
decision-makers,
media,
and
the
public.
In
the
case
of
HS2,
the
lack
of
clear
transport
objectives
meant
the
strategic
need
was
not
clear.
It
is
also
essential
to
make
clear
who
is
in
charge.
The
ICE
says:
‘Clarity
about
how
decisions
are
made,
who
makes
them,
and
when,
is
essential.
Corporate
governance
and
technical
understanding
in
sponsoring
government
departments
should
be
improved
to
help
with
decision-making.
In
the
case
of
HS2,
steps
should
have
been
taken
to
protect
institutional
memory
as
the
project
progressed.
Important
knowledge
was
lost
when
people
moved
on
to
other
roles.’
A
further
recommendation
is
that
contracts
need
to
be
based
on
mature
designs
rather
than
concepts,
and
sufficient
time
is
needed
to
assess
different
options
and
make
sure
that
the
choices
are
in
line
with
the
best
practice.
In
the
case
of
HS2
a
standardised
design
could
have
been
used
for
things
like
bridges,
which
would
have
helped
to
keep
costs
down,
but
this
was
not
clearly
agreed
in
the
development
process.
The
ICE’s
trustee
for
policy
and
external
affairs
Jonathan
Spruce
said:
‘The
cancellation
of
HS2’s
Northern
leg
exemplifies
how
impossible
it
is
to
separate
major
infrastructure
projects
from
politics.
To
succeed
and
deliver
desired
outcomes,
projects
like
HS2
require
commitment
that
spans
parties
and
political
cycles.
The
number
one
lesson
is
that
governments
need
to
think
long-term,
select
and
prioritise
projects
based
on
strategic
needs,
and
follow
through.
Getting
it
right
improves
people’s
lives.’
C.K.
Mak,
who
is
an
Honorary
Professor
in
the
Civil
Engineering
Department
at
the
University
of
Hong
Kong,
chaired
the
paper’s
steering
group.
He
said:
‘Political
and
public
support
for
infrastructure
projects
is
more
important
than
ever.
Understanding
why
a
flagship
project
like
HS2
failed
and
what
needs
to
be
done
differently
is
relevant
not
just
for
the
UK,
but
for
governments
all
over
the
world.’
